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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 David Leon Johnson appeals from his judgment of conviction for two 
counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 A jury convicted Johnson of two counts of lewd conduct with a child, but 
the Idaho Supreme Court found error in the admission of prior bad act evidence, 
vacated his convictions, and remanded for further proceedings.  State v. 
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 227 P.3d 918 (2010).  On remand Johnson was tried 
and convicted again for two counts of lewd conduct with a child, and did not 
appeal.  State v. Johnson, Docket No. 39762, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 
635, p. 2 (Idaho App., Aug. 20, 2013) (affirming the denial of Johnson’s I.C.R. 35 
and I.R.C.P. 60(b) motions).  His appeal rights were later reinstated in post-
conviction proceedings.  (R., p. 88; see also 11/16/15 Tr.)  He timely appealed 
from the re-entered judgment.  (R., pp. 88, 101.) 






 Johnson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court’s instruction informing the jury pool that 
a prior trial had occurred, that Mr. Johnson’s prior convictions were 
overturned, and that the Idaho Supreme Court had remanded the 
case for a new trial violate Mr. Johnson’s constitutional right to a 
fair trial before an impartial jury? 
 
2. Did the district court err in denying the motion for a mistrial 
made after the State improperly commented on Mr. Johnson’s 
invocation of his right to silence? 
 
3. Did the district court err in denying the motion for a mistrial 
after the court erroneously allowed Mr. Wilson to testify with the aid 
of a report, despite the fact that his memory was not refreshed by 
the contents of the report, and after finding that the State’s failure to 
disclose the report amounted to a discovery violation? 
 
4. Do the errors in Mr. Jonson’s case amount to cumulative 
error? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. The district court did inform the jury panel that this case was being re-tried 
after an appeal, but did not, contrary to Johnson’s claim, inform the jury of any 
conviction.  Has Johnson failed to show error in the denial of his motion to strike 
the panel for bias? 
 
2. Detective Snarr testified about the general course of his investigation, 
including who he interviewed.  When asked if he had interviewed anyone else he 
stated he “tried” to interview Johnson. Has Johnson failed to show error in the 
denial of his motion for mistrial based upon this testimony? 
 
3. During trial a state’s witness, Scott Wilson, was allowed to testify about 
Johnson’s work schedule on two days in March 2014, based on refreshed 
recollection.  The document he used to refresh his memory was a report from 
time records kept by the business, generated the day before he testified.  Has 
Johnson failed to show error in the district court’s rulings on the admissibility of 
refreshed testimony or the potential prejudicial effect of late-disclosed evidence? 
 








Johnson Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Strike The 




 At the June 6, 2011, pre-trial conference Johnson expressed a desire to 
change venue or, alternatively, to have a questionnaire submitted to the potential 
jurors.  (Supp. R., p. 163.1)  The district court instructed Johnson’s counsel to 
submit a proposed questionnaire and scheduled a hearing on all remaining pre-
trial motions for June 24, 2011.  (Supp. R., pp. 163-64.)  As instructed, Johnson’s 
counsel submitted the proposed questionnaire the next day.  (Supp. R., pp. 165-
68.)  On June 17, 2011, the district court entered an order that stated the 
following: 
On June 22nd and 23rd, 2011, the court will conduct preliminary 
jury selection proceedings in this case. Before the potential jurors 
complete the Supplemental Juror Questionnaire, the court will give 
verbal preliminary instructions and information about the charges in 
this case. A written copy of the court's intended comments is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
 
Any objection to Exhibit A must be made in writing and filed with the 
clerk …, before 5:00 p.m. on June 21, 2011. 
 
(Supp. R., p. 169.)  The “intended comments” in “Exhibit A” included, “There was 
a prior trial in this case in 2006.  Following an appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded the case to this court for a new trial.”  (Supp. R., p. 171.)  
Neither party filed an objection to this proposed language.  (See, generally, 
                                            
1 Page citations to the supplemental record are to the pages in the electronic file 
rather than the page numbers stamped on the documents, which appear to be 




Supp. R.)  Having received no objection, the district court used the intended 
comments in relation to having the jury panel fill out the questionnaire on June 22 
and 23, 2011.  (Compare Supp. R., pp. 171-72 with 6/22 & 23/11 Tr., p. 5, L. 8 – 
p. 7, L. 10; p. 11, L. 16 – p. 14, L. 4; p. 19, L. 5 – p. 21, L. 8; p. 25, L. 8 – p. 27, 
L. 10.) 
 On June 24, 2011, the district court vacated the hearing on outstanding 
motions because Johnson’s counsel was in a jury trial in another court.  (6/24/11 
Tr., p. 48, Ls. 8-13.)  On June 27, 2011, Johnson filed a motion in limine seeking 
a ruling to prevent “any reference to a prior trial in this case.”  (Supp. R., pp. 186-
87.)   
When the motion in limine was addressed on June 27, 2011, the district 
court pointed out that it had already informed the jury panel of the prior trial and 
that the Idaho Supreme Court on appeal had reversed and remanded for a new 
trial.  (Trial Tr., p. 74, L. 3 – p. 75, L. 12.)  Johnson’s trial counsel was “very 
concerned” about the district court having provided that information because the 
jury panel was “in effect” informed that Johnson had “previously been convicted.”  
(Trial Tr., p. 75, Ls. 13-15.)  The district court pointed out that the jury panel had 
been informed of the prior trial and remand, but “[t]he word ‘convicted’ was never 
used.”  (Trial Tr., p. 75, Ls. 16-18.)  Counsel clarified that he believed the fact of 
conviction was the only “reasonable inference” the jury could draw from the 
information provided.  (Trial Tr., p. 75, Ls. 19-21; see also p. 76, Ls. 18-24.)  




responded, “Well, perhaps it was because I’ve been in trial.”  (Trial Tr., p. 77, 
Ls. 10-22.)   
The court then (1) noted that it would be instructing the jury on the 
presumption of innocence; (2) explained that a specific curative instruction might 
only serve to highlight the fact of a prior trial; and (3) stated that it would be 
willing to excuse any potential juror who indicated in voir dire that the fact of a 
prior trial would weigh on his or her decision.  (Trial Tr., p. 78, L. 16 – p. 79, 
L. 15.)  The district court then asked the parties if that was an adequate 
response.  (Trial Tr., p. 79, Ls. 15-17.)  The prosecutor expressed agreement 
with that procedure.  (Trial Tr., p. 79, Ls. 18-19.)  The defense stated it was “not 
going to object to that” (Trial Tr., p. 79, Ls. 20-22), but moved “that this matter be 
vacated, that we select a new panel, and that they not be informed of the 
reversal and remand” (Trial Tr., p. 80, L. 11 – p. 81, L. 16).  The district court took 
the motion to strike the panel under advisement and took a recess.  (Trial Tr., 
p. 82, Ls. 1-16.) 
Upon reconvening the district court denied the motion to strike the panel.  
(Trial Tr., p. 82, Ls. 17-21.)  The court ruled there were to be no references to the 
prior trial in the current trial and that the court intended to emphasize the 
presumption of innocence.  (Trial Tr., p. 82, L. 17 – p. 83, L. 13.)  Prior to the 
start of voir dire the court did instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence.  
(Trial Tr., p. 97, L. 16 – p. 98, L. 5; p. 234, L. 25 – p. 235, L. 14.)  The district 
court again instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence after it was sworn 




district court and counsel also questioned the jury panel regarding whether any 
potential juror had formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief that 
Johnson was or was not guilty (Trial Tr., p. 110, Ls. 1-6; p. 256, Ls. 20-24) and 
whether the potential jurors could follow the reasonable doubt and presumption 
of innocence instructions (Trial Tr., p. 369, L. 20 – p. 371, L. 8; p. 403, L. 24 – 
p. 405, L. 19).  
On appeal Johnson argues that the “district court’s instruction informing 
jurors that Mr. Johnson had already been convicted of the precise charges before 
them and had been awarded a new trial when the Idaho Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded the case violated his constitutional right to a fair trial before an 
impartial jury.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.2)  Johnson’s claim of jury bias fails for 
three reasons.  First, Johnson waived it by later, after voir dire, passing the 
remaining panel for cause.  (Trial Tr., p. 432, Ls. 19-21.)  Second, even if not 
waived, Johnson’s argument is factually without merit because the jury was not 
informed he “had already been convicted of the precise charges before them.”  
Rather, the jury was informed, “There was a prior trial in this case in 2006.  
Following an appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case 
to this court for a new trial.”  (Supp. R., p. 171.)  Third, the argument is also 
legally without merit because the mention of a prior trial and appeal was not so 
extremely and inherently prejudicial that the jury was not susceptible to 
rehabilitation through further questioning. 
                                            
2 Johnson also argues that the state will not be able to demonstrate the error he 
claims to be harmless.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 23-25.)  However, this argument is 
legally irrelevant because jury bias is not subject to harmless error analysis.  




B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “‘The decision whether a juror can render a fair and impartial verdict is 
directed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent 
an abuse of discretion.’”  State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 421, 348 P.3d 1, 36 
(2015) (quoting State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 688, 85 P.3d 656, 664 (2004)).   
To determine whether an abuse of discretion occurred this Court 
uses a three-part test: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
   
State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 979, 188 P.3d 912, 921 (2008). 
 
C. Johnson Waived Any Claim That The Jury That Ultimately Tried Him Was 
Biased 
 
 After the initial motion to strike the panel was rejected and after 
conducting voir dire, Johnson’s trial counsel passed the panel for cause.  (Trial 
Tr., p. 432, Ls. 19-21.)  “‘Passing a jury for cause at the conclusion of voir dire 
“indicates [ ] satisfaction with the jury as finally constituted.”’”  State v. Pratt, 
160 Idaho 248, 251, 371 P.3d 302, 305 (2016) (brackets and internal quotes 
original, quoting Mulford v. Union Pacific Railroad, 156 Idaho 134, 139, 321 P.3d 
684, 689 (2014)).  Passing for cause therefore “waived any claim that the jury 
panel was biased.”  Id. at 250, 371 P.3d at 304.  Because Johnson expressed 
satisfaction with the jury as finally constituted, after having had the opportunity to 
explore potential bias through voir dire, his claim that the jury that tried him was 





D. Even If The Issue Were Not Waived, Johnson Has Shown No Abuse Of 
Discretion In The Denial Of His Motion To Strike The Panel 
 
 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable 
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
provides “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed ....”  U.S. Const. amend VI.  Further, the Idaho 
Constitution establishes “the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” Idaho 
Const. art. I, § 7.  Therefore, a defendant’s constitutional rights are implicated 
where the defendant is denied impartial jurors.  State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 
862, 332 P.3d 767, 774 (2014). “Actual bias deals with the specific state of mind 
of an individual juror and is proved by questioning the juror about his actual 
biases.  Implied bias, however, conclusively presumes bias as a matter of law 
based on the existence of a specific fact.”  State v. Lankford, No. 35617, 
2016 WL 4010851 at *2 (Idaho July 25, 2016) (rehearing granted).  
Courts generally “have held that the fact that a jury knew that the 
defendant has been found guilty or convicted by a previous jury for the same 
crime creates an implied bias” in the jury.  Id. at *3.  However, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has not decided “whether the disclosure of a prior conviction for 
the same offense would be cause for a finding of implied bias.”  Id.  See also 
State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 766, 274 P.3d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(Court of Appeals also deferring to decide if knowledge of a prior conviction 
creates implied bias).  The Court did not decide this issue in Lankford because 




was previously found guilty.”  Lankford, 2016 WL 4010851 at *3. Rather, during 
voir dire, the district court stated: “‘There was a prior trial in Idaho County in 1984 
for the offenses for which he is now charged.  And an Appeals Court held that 
Mr. Lankford was not effectively represented and that his trial was therefore 
unfair.’”  Id.   
“Idaho law has clearly distinguished between the mention of a previous 
trial and the mention of a previous conviction.”  Id. (citing Watkins, 152 Idaho at 
766, 274 P.3d at 1281).  Because the district court did not mention a conviction, 
the proper issue was “whether the mention of a prior trial and appeal is so 
extremely and inherently prejudicial that the jury is not susceptible to 
rehabilitation through further questioning.”  Id. (emphasis original, internal 
quotations omitted).   
The Court addressed that issue, and held that mention of a prior trial and 
appeal was not “extremely and inherently prejudicial” under the facts of that case.  
Id. at *3-4.  See also Watkins, 152 Idaho at 766-67, 274 P.3d at 1281-82 
(mention of a “prior trial” and “the appeals court” was not disclosure of a 
conviction requiring reversal).  The Court held that, where the jury had been 
informed of a prior trial and appeal, the defendant asserting jury bias must 
demonstrate actual bias or an “extreme case” or “extreme circumstances” rising 
to the level of implied bias.  Lankford, 2016 WL 4010851 at *3-4. 
 As in Lankford and Watkins, the jury panel in the present case was made 
aware that there had been a prior trial and an appeal, but was not told there had 




p. 11, L. 16 – p. 14, L. 4; p. 19, L. 5 – p. 21, L. 8; p. 25, L. 8 – p. 27, L. 10.)  The 
question addressed by the district court below was therefore “whether the 
mention of a prior trial and appeal [was] so extremely and inherently prejudicial 
that the jury [was] not susceptible to rehabilitation through further questioning.”  
Lankford, 2016 WL 4010851 at *3 (emphasis original).  The applicable legal 
standard was whether the defense had demonstrated actual bias or “extreme 
circumstances” rising to the level of showing implied bias.  Id.  The district court 
answered this in the negative, concluding that any potential unfair prejudice could 
be cured.  (Trial Tr., p. 78, L. 16 – p. 79, L. 15; p. 82, L. 17 – p. 83, L. 13.)  The 
district court did not err in that determination.  The record shows neither actual 
bias nor an “extreme case” demonstrating implied bias. 
 Johnson claims the district court did err, and attempts to distinguish 
Lankford and Watkins by claiming that in this case the jury “was essentially 
informed that Mr. Johnson had been previously convicted” because the district 
court used the word “‘reversed,’ clearly indicating that it was Mr. Johnson’s prior 
conviction that had been reversed.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-21.)  This argument 
does not withstand analysis.  As stated above, the district court in Lankford, 
2016 WL 4010851 at *3, stated, “‘There was a prior trial in Idaho County in 1984 
for the offenses for which he is now charged.  And an Appeals Court held that 
Mr. Lankford was not effectively represented and that his trial was therefore 
unfair.’”  This statement is indistinguishable from what the district court told the 
jury panel in this case.  Likewise, in Watkins, 152 Idaho at 766, 274 P.3d at 1281, 




trial and appeal is tantamount to telling the jury that [the defendant] had been 
found guilty by a previous jury.”   
There was no magical significance in the use of the word, “reversed.”  This 
case is indistinguishable from Lankford and Watkins in that in all three cases the 
jurors were made aware there had been a prior trial and the necessity of a new 
trial as a result of an appeal.  The district court in this case properly answered the 
question of whether “the mention of a prior trial and appeal [was] so extremely 
and inherently prejudicial that the jury [was] not susceptible to rehabilitation 
through further questioning,” Lankford, 2016 WL 4010851 at *3-5, in the 
negative.     
 Johnson also argues that the district court erred by not finding bias 
because the three factors deemed determinative in Lankford are allegedly not 
present here.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 21-23.)  This argument fails on the 
applicable legal standard.  “In determining whether an ‘extreme situation’ exists 
each case must turn on its own facts.”  Lankford, 2016 WL 4010851 at *4.  Even 
if the facts of this case differ from those in Lankford, such does not meet 
Johnson’s burden of showing an extreme case meriting a finding of implied bias. 
 Moreover, a review of the facts in this case shows no “extreme case” 
requiring a finding of implied bias.  Most importantly, contrary to Johnson’s 
argument, the record shows the jury was not informed that Johnson had been 
convicted of the “precise charges” he faced (Appellant’s brief, p. 13), but rather 
had been informed only of a prior trial and appeal (6/22 & 23/11 Tr., p. 5, L. 8 – 




L. 10).  Also contrary to Johnson’s argument (Appellant’s brief, p. 21 (trial 
counsel objected “at the earliest opportunity”)), the district court gave Johnson’s 
counsel the opportunity to object prior to the statement associated with the jury 
questionnaire (Supp. R., pp. 169-71), but counsel did not because he was busy 
with a different trial (Trial Tr., p. 77, Ls. 10-22).  The district court concluded the 
instructions addressing the presumption of innocence and burden of proof would 
suffice to address prejudice, while a curative instruction specifically addressing 
the comment about the former trial and appeal would likely call attention to the 
statement and therefore be less effective.  (Trial Tr., p. 78, L. 16 – p. 79, L. 15.)  
Importantly, although Johnson on appeal believes that a curative instruction 
should have been given (Appellant’s brief, p. 22), Johnson’s trial counsel 
specifically concurred with the district court’s reasoning regarding the lack of a 
curative instruction (Trial Tr., p. 79, Ls. 20-22).  Finally, Johnson’s appellate 
argument that the prosecutor’s comments (that he believed “the best thing to do 
is to stay away” from any mention of the prior trial or appeal) prevented his trial 
counsel from inquiring in voir dire about actual or implied bias (Appellant’s brief, 
p. 22) is specious.  On the contrary, the potential jurors were subjected to a full 
voir dire by the district court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel.  (Trial Tr., 
p. 91, L. 7 – p. 432, L. 18.)  In fact, after conducting voir dire Johnson’s trial 
counsel was sufficiently satisfied that he passed the remaining jury panel for 
cause (Trial Tr., p. 432, Ls. 19-21), indicating that prior concerns about bias had 
been allayed by voir dire.  See Pratt, 160 Idaho at 250, 371 P.3d at 304.  




demonstrate actual or implied bias, and has therefore failed to show error in the 
denial of his motion to strike the jury panel. 
 
II. 




 Detective Snarr testified generally about his investigation in this case, 
including arranging for a forensic interview of the victim and interviewing two 
family members.  (Trial Tr., p. 712, L. 8 – p. 714, L. 15; p. 724, L. 4 – p. 726, 
L. 23.)  When asked the yes or no question of whether he had interviewed 
“[a]nyone else,” he responded, “Tried to interview Mr. Johnson.”  (Trial Tr., 
p. 726, Ls. 24-25.) 
 Johnson objected and, outside the presence of the jury, requested a 
mistrial, asserting a violation of his right to silence.  (Trial Tr., p. 727, Ls. 1-21.)  
The district court concluded that the detective’s statement was inadmissible 
because it created an “impermissible inference of guilt.”  (Trial Tr., p. 729, Ls. 16-
23; p. 731, Ls. 20-23; p. 735, Ls. 6-11; see also p. 734, Ls. 4-9 (prosecutor 
representing that detective called Johnson, but Johnson invoked right to contact 
attorney).)  The district court sustained the objection, decided to give a curative 
instruction at that time, but deferred a decision on the motion for mistrial.  (Trial 
Tr., p. 737, L. 10 – p. 738, L. 1.)  The district court provided the language of the 
proposed curative instruction to the parties and asked for input.  (Trial Tr., p. 738, 
Ls. 4-19.)  The defense did not “join the Court in that instruction,” but did not offer 




arguments and ruling would be ascribed to the defense.  (Trial Tr., p. 738, L. 20 – 
p. 739, L. 15.)  After addressing a few more issues, the jury was brought back in 
and the district court instructed them that the objection had been sustained; the 
answer stricken; and that they were to draw no inferences from the testimony, 
including any inference of guilt from Johnson’s invocation of the right to silence.  
(Trial Tr., p. 745, L. 3 – p. 746, L. 12.)   After the close of the state’s case, the 
district court denied the mistrial motion, finding any prejudice had been “vitiated.”  
(Trial Tr., p. 1084, L. 16 – p. 1085, L. 6.)    
 Johnson contends the district court erred by not granting a mistrial 
because his due process rights were infringed when Detective Snarr testified he 
tried to interview Johnson.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 25-36.3)  He has failed to 
demonstrate, however, that the district court’s determination that, although the 
statement did implicate due process, the curative action of sustaining the 
defense objection, striking the statement, and instructing the jury to draw no 
                                            
3 Johnson asserts his argument as both a due process violation and prosecutorial 
misconduct.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 26-36.)  However, a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct is a due process claim.  Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987) 
(“This Court has recognized that prosecutorial misconduct may ‘so infec[t] the 
trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’”) 
(brackets original, quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).  
See also State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 716, 215 P.3d 414, 436 (2009) 
(objectionable conduct by prosecutor reversible only if it “prejudiced the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial”); State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318, 127 P.3d 
212, 221 (Ct. App. 2005) (“The touchstone of due process analysis in cases of 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of 
the prosecutor. The aim of due process is not the punishment of society for the 
misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.”) 






inferences from the statement, were sufficient to protect Johnson’s due process 
rights.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 A “mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there 
occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct 
inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and 
deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” I.C.R. 29.1(a). The standard for reviewing a 
district court’s denial of a motion for mistrial is well established: 
The question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably 
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the 
mistrial motion was made.  Rather, the question must be whether 
the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented 
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.  Thus, 
where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the 
“abuse of discretion” standard is a misnomer.  The standard, more 
accurately stated, is one of reversible error.  Our focus is upon the 
continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the 
mistrial motion.  The trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will be 
disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted 
reversible error. 
 
State v. Passons, 158 Idaho 286, 292–93, 346 P.3d 303, 309–10 (Ct. App. 2015) 
(internal brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 
1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983)).  The appellant “has the burden of showing that the 
trial court’s refusal to declare a mistrial constituted reversible error.”  State v. 
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601, 768 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1989).  See also State v. 
Fluery, 123 Idaho 9, 11, 843 P.2d 159, 161 (Ct. App. 1992) (mistrial standard “is 




burden to show prejudicial error, and absent such a showing, error will be 
deemed harmless” (internal quotation omitted)). 
 
C. Johnson Has Shown No Error In The District Court’s Determination That 
Curative Action Short Of A Mistrial Could Render The Trial Compliant With 
Due Process 
 
 “A mistrial may be declared, upon the defendant’s motion, if there has 
been an error or legal defect during the trial which is prejudicial to the defendant 
and deprives the defendant of a fair trial.”  State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 603, 
930 P.2d 1039, 1045 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing I.C.R. 29.1).  “The core inquiry” 
when denial of a mistrial is challenged on appeal is “whether it appears from the 
record that the event triggering the mistrial motion contributed to the verdict, 
leaving the appellate court with a reasonable doubt that the jury would have 
reached the same result had the event not occurred.”  State v. Palin, 106 Idaho 
70, 75, 675 P.2d 49, 54 (Ct. App. 1983).   
The Idaho appellate courts have repeatedly held that where “improper 
testimony inadvertently arises and the trial court promptly instructs the jury to 
disregard the evidence, it must be presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court’s 
direction entirely.”  State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601, 768 P.2d 1331, 1334 
(1989) (citing State v. Rolfe, 92 Idaho 467, 444 P.2d 428 (1968); State v. Boothe, 
103 Idaho 187, 646 P.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1982)).  To show a due process violation 
despite a curative instruction a claimant must show an “overwhelming probability” 
that the instruction was ignored.  State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631, 97 P.3d 1014, 
1020 (Ct. App. 2004) (in context of instruction to disregard prejudicial evidence 




We presume that the jury followed the jury instructions given by the 
trial court in reaching its verdict and that, although not always 
dispositive, the court is entitled to rely on assurances from venire 
persons concerning partiality or bias. Consequently, any 
inappropriate effect the advisement might have had on the jury was 
properly addressed by the district court’s questioning and 
instruction. 
 
2016 WL 4010851 at *5 (internal quotes, citations and brackets omitted).  See 
also Watkins, 152 Idaho at 767-68, 274 P.3d at 1282-83 (applying rebuttable 
presumption where curative instruction given after mention of prior trial during 
course of presentation of evidence).  Johnson has failed to show an 
overwhelming probability that the district court’s curative instruction, combined 
with the opportunity to voir dire the potential jurors regarding potential bias, was 
insufficient to eliminate any reasonable probability of bias. 
The district court’s curative instruction did three things: (1) it sustained the 
objection and struck the statement; (2) it informed the jury of the right to silence 
and that a defendant was entitled to invoke that right; and (3) it told the jury to 
“disregard” the statement and, further, “to draw no inferences at all” from the 
stricken statement.  (Trial Tr., p. 746, Ls. 3-12.)  The entirety of the stricken 
statement was that the detective “[t]ried to interview Mr. Johnson.”  (Trial Tr., 
p. 726, Ls. 24-25.)  At no point did the prosecution encourage or invite the jury to 
draw any inference from this evidence, much less an improper one.  (See 
generally Trial Tr.)  There is no reason on this record to believe that the jury drew 
an impermissible inference of guilt from the stricken statement, much less 







Johnson Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Rulings On The 





 In order to address Johnson’s activities in the general time-frame of the 
charge,4 the state presented the testimony of Scott Wilson, the former owner of 
Trilogy Network Systems, Johnson’s employer at that time.  (Trial Tr., p. 622, L. 6 
– p. 628, L. 3.)  Wilson testified that Johnson had worked on March 19, 2004.  
(Trial Tr., p. 628, Ls. 4-8.)  When asked how much time Johnson had worked, 
Wilson asked if he could “refer to some notes.”  (Trial Tr., p. 628, Ls. 9-10.)  The 
“notes” were a “report” Wilson “generated from a time tracking system” used in 
his business.  (Trial Tr., p. 630, L. 18 – p. 631, L. 6.)  The report was extracted 
from “time sheets” submitted by Johnson for billing clients of the company, and 
reflected “work done by Mr. Johnson” from March 19 and March 22, 2004.  (Trial 
Tr., p. 634, Ls. 2-14.)  Wilson had generated the report “yesterday” and had not 
provided a copy of the report to the state.  (Trial Tr., p. 630, Ls. 24-25; p. 632, 
Ls. 2-8.)  He had generated the report only to “refresh [his] own memory.”  (Trial 
Tr., p. 635, L. 22 – p. 636, L. 11.)   
 The defense objected that it had not seen the report prior to its mention in 
court.  (Trial Tr., p. 633, Ls. 1-4; p. 637, Ls. 2-15.)  The district court concluded 
that the report, having been reviewed by the witness to refresh his recollection, 
could not be used “further.”  (Trial Tr., p. 637, L. 24 – p. 638, L. 8; see also 
                                            
4 The parties and the trial judge engaged in a thorough, and lengthy, discussion 
of the relevance and probative nature of the evidence.  (Trial Tr., p. 663, L. 1 – 




p. 638, L. 20 – p. 639, L. 18.)  Defense counsel stated he was “satisfied with 
that.”  (Trial Tr., p. 638, Ls. 9-10.)  The district court, at Johnson’s request, 
instructed the bailiff to take custody of the report.  (Trial Tr., p. 640, Ls. 5-8.)   
 Shortly after the state resumed direct examination of Wilson, Johnson 
objected that Wilson was not testifying from refreshed recollection, but only his 
recollection of the report, which was “a backdoor approach to introducing the 
documentary evidence that was never disclosed to the defense.”  (Trial Tr., 
p. 640, L. 22 – p. 651, L. 17.)  The district court and the parties further inquired of 
Wilson regarding the generation of the report, and Wilson testified that, the 
previous afternoon when he had arrived to testify, he “was asked” by one of the 
prosecutors “to try to verify what Mr. Johnson was doing on March 22nd” so he 
produced the document “on his own” in order to “refresh [his] memory on what 
[Johnson] was doing that day.”  (Trial Tr., p. 655, L. 23 – p. 662, L. 13.) 
 Johnson moved for a mistrial because the defense “had no opportunity to 
examine the primary documentation from which [the report] came.”  (Trial Tr., 
p. 667, L. 20 – p. 668, L. 4.)  After some initial comments, the district court took 
the motion under advisement.  (Trial Tr., p. 668, L. 5 – p. 669, L. 7.)   
 After the recess, the district court took up both issues regarding the use of 
the report, first re-affirming its ruling on allowing Wilson to testify based on 
refreshed recollection under I.R.E. 612, concluding the state “did just provide 
sufficient foundation to satisfy the requirements of Rule 612 for the use of that 
document.”  (Trial Tr., p. 675, L. 4 – p. 677, L. 2.)  The district court then 




violation “in form, if not in substance” because of the timing of the generation and 
disclosure of the report.  (Trial Tr., p. 677, Ls. 3-11.)  The district court took the 
motion under advisement because “the appropriate sanction” was “difficult to 
assess” at that time.  (Trial Tr., p. 677, Ls. 18-25.)  The district court stated that it 
would assess “whether or not the disputed matter has so prejudiced the defense 
in the preparation of its defense that it’s been deprived of a fair trial,” and the 
factors it was considering were the “weight of the particular disputed evidence,” 
whether the defense was allowed access to the underlying data, and whether 
cross-examination “may address the weight of this evidence.” (Trial Tr., p. 677, 
L. 24 – p. 679, L. 21.)  The district court later denied the motion for mistrial.  (Trial 
Tr., p. 1084, L. 12 – p. 1085, L. 6.) 
 On appeal Johnson asserts the district court erred in both its rulings 
concerning the use of the report.  First, Johnson claims the district court erred by 
admitting Wilson’s testimony, claiming it was not in fact based on memory 
refreshed by the report.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 48-50.)  Second, Johnson argues 
that the district court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based on the 
timing of the disclosure of the report.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 50-53.)  Johnson has 
failed to show error in relation to either claim.     
 
B. Johnson Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In Admitting Wilson’s 
Refreshed Testimony 
 
 Idaho Rule of Evidence 612 states, in its entirety: 
(a)  If while testifying, a witness uses a writing or object to refresh 
the memory of the witness, an adverse party is entitled to have the 
writing or object produced at the trial, hearing, or deposition in 




(b)  Before testifying. If, before testifying, a witness uses a writing 
or object, not privileged under these rules or not protected from 
disclosure under Rule 26 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or 
Rule 16 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, to refresh the memory of the 
witness for the purpose of testifying and the court in its discretion 
determines that the interests of justice so require, an adverse party 
is entitled to have the writing or object produced, if practicable, at 
the trial, hearing, or deposition in which the witness is testifying.  
    
(c)  Terms and conditions of production and use. A party entitled to 
have a writing or object produced under this rule is entitled to 
inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in 
evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the 
witness. If production of the writing or object at the trial, hearing, or 
deposition is impracticable, the court may order it made available 
for inspection. If it is claimed that the writing or object contains 
matters not related to the subject matter of the testimony the court 
shall examine the writing or object in camera, excise any portions 
not so related, and order delivery of the remainder to the party 
entitled thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall 
be preserved and made available to the appellate court in the event 
of an appeal. If a writing or object is not produced, made available 
for inspection, or delivered pursuant to order under this rule, the 
court shall make any order justice requires, except that in criminal 
cases when the prosecution elects not to comply, the order shall be 
one striking the testimony or, if the court in its discretion determines 
that the interests of justice so require, declaring a mistrial.  
 
The plain language of this rule does not address any foundational requirements 
regarding testimony refreshed by review of documents or tangible items.  Rather, 
those are contained in I.R.E. 602: “A witness may not testify to a matter unless 
evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has 
personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, 
but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness.”  
The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the following “excellent analysis of 
the permissible use of documents for purposes of refreshing the recollection of a 




First, the witness must exhibit the need to refresh his or her 
memory and, second, the witness must confirm that the notes will 
assist in refreshing his or her memory. The witness may not testify 
directly from the notes, but can use them to assist in recollection. 
The purpose of Fed.R.Evid. 612 is “to promote the search of 
credibility and memory.” Fed.R.Evid. 612, advisory committee’s 
notes (1972). The court must ensure that the witness actually has a 
present recollection and is not to allow inadmissible evidence to 
inadvertently slip in for its truth. Two safeguards have been devised 
for this purpose. First, the district court has broad discretion in 
determining whether the witness is truly using the writing to refresh 
his or her memory, or whether he or she is effectively offering the 
writing for its truth. Second, Fed.R.Evid. 612 gives opposing 
counsel the right to inspect at trial whatever is used to refresh 
recollection, to cross-examine the witness on it and to introduce 
relevant portions into evidence. 
 
Thomson v. Olsen, 147 Idaho 99, 105, 205 P.3d 1235, 1241 (2009) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885, 892, 934 P.2d 951, 958 
(Ct. App. 1997)).  Review of the record shows the district court did not abuse its 
“broad discretion” when it determined that Wilson was using the report to refresh 
his recollection, rather than merely reciting information contained in the report. 
 First, the testimony of the witness provided foundation for concluding that 
the report did in fact refresh his memory.  Wilson repeatedly testified that the 
report refreshed his memory.  (Trial Tr., p. 629, Ls. 17-21; p. 631, Ls. 7-9; p. 632, 
Ls. 6-8; p. 636, Ls. 4-11; p. 642, Ls. 22-25.)  Wilson also testified that he did in 
fact “know at one point in time whether or not Mr. Johnson worked for [him] on 
March 22nd, 2004.”  (Trial Tr., p. 642, Ls. 18-21.)  The defense’s voir dire in aid 
of objection merely established that Wilson had no current memory independent 
of the refreshment of whether Johnson worked the 22nd.  (Trial Tr., p. 643, L. 4 – 
p. 644, L. 9.)  This evidence was sufficient to support the district court’s 




refreshed recollection regarding when and where Johnson worked on the 
relevant dates. 
Second, the district court’s ruling shows it was aware of its discretion, 
applied the correct legal standard, and reached its decision by exercise of 
reason.  The district court initially ruled that sufficient foundation had not been 
laid.  (Trial Tr., p. 629, Ls. 7-10.)  It explained the procedure that should be 
employed to lay foundation.  (Trial Tr., p. 630, Ls. 5-14.)  It articulated the proper 
legal standard and allowed testimony from refreshed memory only, including 
ruling that the report, having refreshed the witness’s memory, not be further used 
in the trial.  (Trial Tr., p. 637, L. 24 – p. 638, L. 10.)  The district court explained, 
as part of its reasoning for its ruling that the report, having refreshed the 
witness’s memory, not be used further in court, that it did not want the jury to 
think the document, as opposed to the refreshed testimony, was the evidence.  
(Trial Tr., p. 638, L. 20 – p. 639, L. 18.)  The district court overruled a renewed 
objection (Trial Tr., p. 644, Ls. 10-18), and reaffirmed its ruling on admissibility 
under Rule 612, stating the state “did just provide sufficient foundation” (Trial Tr., 
p. 676, L. 18 – p. 677, L. 2).  In light of the evidence set forth above, the record 
clearly and amply demonstrates that the district court employed the correct legal 
standard, recognized its discretion, and reached its conclusion by an exercise of 
reason. 
Johnson argues that “Mr. Wilson admitted that he relied completely on his 
notes to determine whether Mr. Johnson was at work on the dates in question, 




specific memory of that information.”  (Appellants brief, p. 49 (citing Trial Tr., 
p. 643, L. 14 – p. 644, L. 9.5)  This argument is factually and legally without merit.  
Wilson testified he had “no recollection of his own” regarding specific events on 
the dates in question.  (Trial Tr., p. 643, L. 14 – p. 644, L. 9.)  The first prong of 
the relevant test, however, is “the witness must exhibit the need to refresh his or 
her memory.”  Olsen, 147 Idaho at 105, 205 P.3d at 1241.  The witness did not 
say he had no personal knowledge of the subjects to which he testified, only that 
he had no unrefreshed memory of them.  
The district court applied the correct legal analysis, reached reasonable 
conclusions regarding the foundation, and exercised its discretion to overrule the 
objection to allowing witness Wilson to provide refreshed testimony.  Johnson 
has failed to demonstrate error. 
In addition, any possible error was harmless.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010) (error will be declared harmless if state 
demonstrates harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt).  The state’s theory of 
the case was that on Friday, March 19, 2004, Michelle Johnson, then Johnson’s 
wife, went to Utah to visit her parents, and returned on Monday, March 22, 2004.  
(Trial Tr., p. 1240, L. 24 – p. 1243, L. 13.)  The state asserted that Johnson met 
Michelle at the school where she was picking up the older children on March 19, 
                                            
5 Johnson also cites post-ruling testimony by Wilson in support of this argument, 
asserting Wilson “may have actually never had knowledge of the specific times 
that Mr. Johnson worked.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 49 (citing Trial Tr., p. 693, L. 2 – 
p. 696, L. 18).)  Because this evidence was not presented to the district court in 
support of the objection, and thus never considered by the district court for this 
purpose, it cannot be properly considered in relation to this claim of error.  
Moreover, the claim the witness “may have” had no personal knowledge falls far 




2004, at about 1:00, and asked that the victim, their eldest daughter, remain 
behind with him.  (Trial Tr., p. 1241, L. 20 – p. 1242, L. 10.)  The crimes occurred 
while Johnson and the victim were home alone together and Michelle was with 
the other children in Utah.  (Trial Tr., p. 1280, L. 21 – p. 1282, L. 9.)  Wilson’s 
testimony regarding Johnson’s work on the 19th and 22nd was to help 
corroborate evidence that Johnson met Michelle at the school at 1:00 on March 
19 and that the victim was with him at work on the 22nd, in order to corroborate 
this chronology and rebut any work-related alibi for those two dates.  (Trial Tr., 
p. 666, Ls. 5-22.)  Wilson’s testimony was, in turn, corroborated by the work 
schedule Johnson himself kept.  (State’s Exhibit U; Trial Tr., p. 1183, L. 12 – 
p. 1187, L. 23.)  Ultimately Johnson generally denied the crime and asserted the 
evidence showed that Michelle did not visit her parents that weekend, but did not 
contend that work was an alibi.  (Trial Tr., p. 1138, L. 22 – p. 1156, L. 22; 
p. 1252, L. 22 – p. 1280, L. 13.)  Whether Johnson’s work schedule on March 19 
and 22 corroborated the state’s evidence and theory of opportunity was 
ultimately a very minor part of the trial, and introduction of Wilson’s testimony 






C. The Timing Of The Disclosure Of The Work Records Did Not Violate 
Johnson’s Due Process Rights6 
 
 “Where the late disclosure of evidence forms the basis of an alleged due 
process violation, the defendant must show the late disclosure to have been so 
prejudicial to the defendant’s preparation of his or her case that a fair trial was 
denied.”  State v. Iverson, 155 Idaho 766, 777, 316 P.3d 682, 693 (Ct. App. 
2014) (citing State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 255, 899 P.2d 959, 965 (1995)).  
This same standard applies when the alleged late disclosure is also a discovery 
violation.  State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 199, 16 P.3d 288, 296 (Ct. App. 
2000).  “To prove prejudice, a defendant must show there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for the late disclosure, the result of the proceedings would 
have been different.”  Id.  To prevail on his claim, Johnson must make a 
“showing of specific prejudice.”  State v. Gerdau, 96 Idaho 516, 518, 531 P.2d 
1161, 1163 (1975).     
 As noted above, the evidence in question went to Johnson’s work on 
March 19 and 22, 2004, and whether that was consistent with him picking up the 
victim from school at 1:00 on March 19, 2004, and having her at his workplace on 
March 22, 2004.  Johnson contends the evidence was “critically important and 
extremely prejudicial” (Appellant’s brief, p. 52), but this argument is irrelevant 
                                            
6 The state asserts there was no discovery violation, as the prosecution learned 
of the report, at best, a day before it was used at trial to refresh Wilson’s 
memory.  Therefore, Johnson is asserting a due process claim based on the 
timing of the disclosure to both parties.  Regardless of whether there was a 
violation of I.C.R. 16, the legal standard requiring that Johnson show prejudice 
from the timing of the disclosure of the report is the same.  State v. Barcella, 




(and incorrect, because the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial in the slightest) 
because the issue is unfair prejudice arising from the timing of the disclosure. 
The only arguably relevant argument presented by Johnson is his trial 
counsel was unable to “properly prepare for Mr. Wilson’s testimony due to the 
discovery violation.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 52.)  He fails to back this conclusory 
statement with any plausible scenario of what impeachment more time to prepare 
would have yielded.   Johnson does cite trial counsel’s argument that it was “not 
realistically possible for counsel to conduct an examination of the time reporting 
system and sift through the information while continuing with trial.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 51.)  However, Wilson testified how he had already sifted through the 
information (by use of a computer database search) to find the relevant data, and 
the relevant data was contained in the report.  (Trial Tr., p. 630, L. 18 – p. 631, 
L. 6; p. 634, L. 2 – p. 636, L. 18.)  Johnson has not expressed any non-
speculative basis for concluding that he was prejudiced by the amount of time he 
had to respond to the report generated by Wilson. 
 
IV. 
Johnson Has Failed To Show Errors To Cumulate 
 
“The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there 
is ‘an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, 
but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention 
of the defendant’s constitutional right to due process.”  State v. Draper, 
151 Idaho 576, 594, 261 P.3d 853, 871 (2011) (citations, quotations and 




doctrine is a finding of more than one error.  State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 
958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998).  In addition, cumulative error analysis does not 
include errors neither objected to nor found fundamental.  State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010).  Johnson has failed to show 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of 
conviction. 
 DATED this 28th day of April, 2017. 
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